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The Commitment to EMU  
At Cannes in June 1995, the heads of state and government of the European Union, meeting as 
the European Council, restated their firm resolve to move to the third and final stage of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by January 1, 1999, in strict accordance with the 
convergence criteria, timetable, protocols and procedures laid down by the Treaty on European 
Union. Meeting in Madrid six months later, the leaders made their commitment to moving to 
EMU even more explicit, "confirming unequivocally that stage three of economic and monetary 
union will commence on 1 January 1999." (European Commission 1995, p. 9.)  
Despite the difficulties that many of the member states have encountered since those meetings in 
satisfying the criteria for entry to the third stage, the commitment remains intact. Despite 
recurrent speculation in financial markets and elsewhere about the wisdom of delaying the 
advent of stage three a year or two, we can be fairly confident that the EU will adhere to the 
provisions of Article 109j(4) of the Treaty and move to the third and final stage of EMU on the 
first day of 1999.  
Armed with the European Monetary Institute's (EMI) "reference scenario," the EU is therefore 
now on a course that will result in:  
1. The creation of a new European System of Central Banks (ESCB), consisting of a new 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the existing central banks of the member states. This 
system will assume full responsibility for defining and conducting the monetary policy 
and foreign exchange operations of the participating member states;  
2. The irrevocable fixing of exchange rates and creation of a new single currency, the 
euro.
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The EU confronts many transitional issues as it moves toward EMU. It did, however, solve 
several of the most important problems in 1996. For example, it devised a new "hub and spoke" 
version of the Exchange Rate Mechanism that will link most, if not all, currencies of the member 
states which do not enter the final stage of EMU in 1999 to the euro. This mechanism will 
diminish exchange rate volatility and the temptation among the "outs" to pursue competitive 
devaluations (see Cameron 1996a.) And at Dublin in December 1996, protracted negotiations 
within the Council of Ministers and European Council 
3 finally produced agreement on the 
contours of a so-called "stability pact" (later, at French insistence, renamed the "stability and growth pact"). This pact, its proponents hope, will assure continued fiscal responsibility and 
create a "stability culture" among the participants in the third stage.  
Despite last year's agreements, the implementation of EMU raises a number of difficult and 
contentious issues. These issues concern both the transition to the third stage of EMU and the 
functioning of economic policy after the transition. This paper examines three of the most 
important transitional and post-transitional problems, namely:  
1. Who will qualify for admission? The most important issue in the transition is clearly which 
member states will satisfy the "convergence criteria" described in the Treaty on European Union 
and thereby earn the right to participate in the third stage of EMU in 1999. The uncertainty 
surrounding this issue is compounded by the fact that the European Council will not decide 
which states will participate in the third stage until the spring of 1998, only months before it is to 
begin. 
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2. How will EMU affect growth and employment? The issue here is whether member states who 
do qualify will be able to solve or reduce longstanding economic problems that afflict most of 
them. In particular, will EMU make it easier or harder for them to deal with the endemic problem 
of low economic growth and high unemployment? This question is all the more open because the 
Treaty, for all its elaboration of the structures and responsibilities of the ECB, does not provide 
an answer.  
3. How, if at all, will economic policy be coordinated and conducted among the participant 
member states? Will these governments be able to exercise collective control of their economies? 
What degree of control will be left to them when they lose the ability to affect exchange rates 
and to set monetary and even fiscal policy?  
We can do little more than guess about how these questions will be answered. What is probable 
is that these answers will be defined by and depend upon politics--that is, the choices of the 
leaders, ministers, and officials of the national governments of the member states operating 
within the institutional context of the EU.  
The Transition to the Third Stage: Who Will Qualify?  
The Treaty on European Union stipulates that the member states which move to the third stage of 
EMU must have achieved a "high degree of sustainable convergence." That means that each state 
has achieved, by the terms of Article 109j(1) and Protocol 6:  
1. A "high degree of price stability" (apparent from a rate of inflation as measured 
by the change in consumer prices) that does not exceed by more than 1.5 
percentage points that of the three best performing states;  
2. An average nominal interest rate on long-term government bonds or 
comparable securities that does not exceed by more than two percentage points 
that of the three best performing states in terms of price stability;  3. Observance of the "normal" fluctuation margins of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism of the European Monetary System for at least two years without 
"severe tensions" or a devaluation "on its own initiative"; and  
4. A government budgetary position such that the state is not the subject of a 
decision by the Council of Ministers under Article 104c(6) that an "excessive 
deficit" exists. 
Three of these "convergence criteria" - those pertaining to inflation, interest rates, and 
participation in the ERM - are quite straightforward and can be readily observed and measured. 
And if convergence were judged only by these three criteria, a significant number of member 
states seem to have already achieved the convergence necessary for adoption of a single 
currency. There would therefore be little doubt that the transition to the third stage of EMU could 
take place in 1999 (if not earlier).  
Indeed, a majority of the member states do seem to have met the conditions required for entry to 
stage three of EMU, to judge by the most recent data for rates of inflation and long-term interest 
rates on government securities, and the recent experience of the ERM (presented in Table 1). 
Had "sustainable convergence" been defined only in terms of those three criteria, 9 nations - 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, and 
Finland 
5 - would qualify for stage three on the basis of 1996 data and two others - Spain and 
Portugal - would come very close to qualifying. 
6 Even Italy, which (after Greece) had the 
highest rate of inflation in the EU, would be within hailing distance after having rejoined the 
ERM in November 1996. 
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But the criteria based on inflation, interest rates, and participation in the ERM are not the only 
ones specified by the Treaty. The fourth criterion, which stipulates that a member state not be the 
subject of a Council of Ministers decision that an "excessive deficit" exists, is more problematic.  
What is an "excessive deficit?" By the terms of Article 104c and Protocol 5, an "excessive 
deficit" may exist when either:  
1. The ratio of the planned or actual general government deficit (that is, the 
combined deficit of all levels of government, including social security funds) to 
Gross Domestic Product exceeds three percent. However, this requirement may be 
relaxed if the ratio has declined "substantially and continuously and reached a 
level that comes close" to that figure or, alternatively, if the excess over that 
figure "is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close" to that 
figure); or  
2. The ratio of government debt to GDP exceeds 60 per cent, "unless the ratio is 
sufficiently diminishing and approaching [that figure] at a satisfactory pace." 
Application of these criteria is not automatic. A member state becomes the subject of a Council 
of Ministers decision that an "excessive deficit" exists if the Commission considers that to be the 
case (or a possibility), addresses an opinion and recommendation to the Council to that effect, and the Council, after "having considered any observations which the Member State concerned 
may wish to make" and "after an overall assessment," decides, by qualified majority, to accept 
the Commission's recommendation.  
The primary reason for uncertainty about the future of EMU is uncertainty about how many 
member states satisfying the first three criteria will also satisfy the "excessive deficit" criterion 
when decisions have to be made in 1998. At present, the Council of Ministers (acting in 
accordance with Article 104c(6) of the Treaty) has named only three member states - Denmark 
(as of June 1996), Ireland, and Luxembourg (the latter two as of September 1994) - as not having 
an "excessive deficit." 
8 (In July 1995, the Council concluded that Germany did not have an 
"excessive deficit" but in June 1996 it rescinded that decision.)  
If current projections of the ratios of deficits and debt to GDP hold, 9 other member states are 
likely to meet the convergence criteria for inflation, interest rates, and ERM participation, but 
will probably find that either their deficit-to-GDP ratio or their debt-to-GDP ratio (or both) 
exceed the reference values specified in the Treaty. 
9 The OECD's most recent forecasts of the 
1997 deficit and debt ratios for the EU member states (presented in Table 2) suggest that several 
member states - Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, and Portugal - will have 1997 
deficits of less than three per cent of GDP, but will also have a stock of public debt equivalent to 
more than 60 percent of GDP.  
The Council of Ministers has some discretion that may work to the benefit of these states. In its 
earlier decisions regarding Ireland and Denmark, it waived the debt criterion in cases where the 
deficit was well under three per cent of GDP and the stock of debt was decreasing relative to 
GDP. If it applied this rule again, all of the 9 (with the possible exception of Belgium) might be 
judged not to have an "excessive deficit." 
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But the situation may be more problematic for Germany, France, and Spain. In all three, the 1997 
deficit is likely to be greater than three per cent (3.2 percent in France and 3.4 per cent in 
Germany and Spain). The French and Spanish governments, however, have cut their deficits 
significantly in recent years (from 4.8 percent in 1995 in France and from 6.6 percent in 1995 in 
Spain). 
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Italy's situation is far more problematic. Facing deficits of 7.1 percent of GDP in 1995 and 6.7 
percent in 1996, the Prodi government proposed in 1996 cutting the deficit by some 62 trillion 
lire, specifically in order to reach the EU's target of three per cent by 1997. 
12 By early 1997, the 
Bank of Italy estimated that without another 15 trillion in revenues or expenditure cuts, the 1997 
deficit would be 3.8 per cent of GDP. Moreover, the stock of public debt continued to be in 
excess of 120 percent of GDP - far above the levels found in the other large member states.  
Thus even France and Germany may not satisfy all of the convergence criteria, while most other 
member states have a deficit problem. 
13 The uncertainty that this prospect creates is aggravated 
by the complex and ambiguous procedure by which decisions are made about whether deficits 
are "excessive." The Commission is supposed to monitor the budgetary situation and the stock of 
government debt in each state (in particular, the state's " compliance with budgetary discipline"). According to Article 104c, it must then determine whether member states satisfy one or both of 
the criteria referring to deficits and government debt.  
That determination will inevitably involve discretionary judgments about such issues as whether 
the deficit has declined "substantially and continuously," what level is "close" to three per cent, 
and what constitutes an "exceptional and temporary" excess. 
14 Concerning public debt, the 
Commission will have to judge what constitutes a "sufficiently diminishing" ratio, what 
constitutes a "satisfactory pace," and what "approaching" means. All of these terms - "close," 
"substantially and continuously," "exceptional and temporary," "sufficiently diminishing," and " 
satisfactory pace" - obviously connote discretionary judgment, rather than specific and precise 
figures.  
If, after an assessment of the deficit and debt ratios in the light of these ambiguous terms, the 
Commission decides that an "excessive deficit" exists, it must address an "opinion" to the 
Council of Ministers. But the Treaty at no point specifically defines an "excessive deficit." While 
the language implies that the two budgetary criteria described above define "excessive deficits," 
the Treaty in fact describes them only as "criteria" by which "compliance with budgetary 
discipline" can be "examined." Therefore, whether a deficit is " excessive" depends not on the 
specific deficit and debt figures but rather upon the discretionary judgment of the Commission.  
Finally, even if the Commission renders an opinion that an "excessive deficit" exists, it is still up 
to the Council of Ministers to decide whether the deficit in question is excessive. 
15 To make 
matters even more complex, the European Council, in its deliberations on which states have 
satisfied the convergence criteria, will have before it two reports - one from the Commission, the 
other from the EMI - that examine the admissibility of individual member states. 
16 It will also 
have before it a recommendation from the Council of Ministers on each member state. The 
European Council will then decide - by qualified majority vote - on the overall qualifications of 
member states.  
This complex and ambiguous procedure clearly generates the greatest possible uncertainty about 
the outcome. Its complexity and the great scope for discretionary judgments also create latitude 
for the play of political influence. Such latitude for discretion is expanded by the precedents for 
waiving a Treaty-defined "convergence criterion" set by the decisions on Denmark and Ireland. 
Some of the member states that miss one (or possibly, as in the case of Germany and Spain, 
both) of the budgetary criteria may, therefore, for political reasons, be judged to be qualified for 
participation in the final stage of EMU in 1999. More concretely, that latitude for discretion, 
coupled with the precedents already created in regard to the debt criterion and the likelihood that 
political factors will enter into the decisions, suggests that something of a logroll may ensue. As 
a result, a large number of states - probably 8 and perhaps as many as 10 - will be judged worthy 
of participation in the third stage in 1999, despite predictions based on current data.  
After all, if two states have already benefited from a waiver of one of the "convergence criteria," 
can others with roughly comparable deficit and debt ratios be denied the same indulgence? And 
if one of the criteria has already been waived, can a waiver of some other criterion - e.g., the one 
pertaining to the deficit ratio - be denied? Thus, just as the Council of Ministers decided that 
Denmark and Ireland did not have "excessive deficits," despite debt ratios well above 60 per cent, so too the European Council may decide in 1998 (voting by qualified majority) that France, 
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Spain, and Portugal (as well as Denmark, 
Ireland, and Luxembourg) all have achieved the "high degree of sustainable convergence" 
required for the adoption of a single currency, despite deficit and/or debt ratios in 1997 that are 
slightly larger than the reference values stipulated in Protocol 5 of the Treaty. 
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For those who imagine that such a decision would violate the terms of the Treaty, it is useful to 
recall the words of one who knows that treaty well. In the words of Jacques Delors:  
When one reads the treaty carefully, one sees that it allows for a nuanced interpretation 
.... We must read with great care a treaty which was cleverly drawn up and which leaves 




It will, of course, be important for the member states wishing to enter the third stage of EMU in 
1999 to demonstrate, in their budgetary and fiscal policy in 1997, a commitment to satisfying the 
"convergence criteria." And, of course, prior to the actual decisions in 1998 about participation in 
stage three, all of the relevant actors undoubtedly will continue to insist on the inviolability of 
the criteria.  
But no one should be surprised if - given the ambiguities and the complexity of the qualification 
process - a relatively large number of member states (possibly 8 to 10) end up entering the third 
stage in 1999, notwithstanding the fact that several may have deficit and/or debt ratios larger 
than those described in Protocol 5. The ultimate decision lies, after all, with the European 
Council, a collection of heads of state and government, not with the Council of Ministers, with 
all the shifts in emphasis from the strictly financial toward the political and diplomatic that this 
difference in responsibility implies.  
Economic Policy in the Third Stage: Will EMU Cure Low Growth and High 
Unemployment?  
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union commits all of the member states to promoting  
a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-
inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of 
economic performance, a high level of employment and of social protection.... 
The countries moving to the third stage of EMU may find it difficult to live up to this 
commitment. They will find themselves without some of the traditional instruments of 
macroeconomic management. Exchange rates will be irrevocably fixed, and monetary policy will 
be under the control of the ECB. Fiscal policy will be constrained by the "excessive deficits" 
criterion of the Treaty and by the sanctions on such deficits stipulated in the "stability and 
growth pact." The homogeneity demanded by membership of EMU will make it all the harder 
for individual governments to respond to shocks that may affect particular regions and/or 
countries more than others. Such shocks, and national governments to cope with them, may 
jeopardize attainment of the EU's overall goals - especially those of "balanced development," "sustainable growth," "convergence of economic performance," and a "high level of 
employment." Member states are likely to find it even more difficult to respond to a larger, more 
intractable problem - the sclerotic performance of their economies over the long term.  
With few exceptions (Ireland in terms of growth, Luxembourg in terms of unemployment), the 
EU has become an area of low economic growth and high unemployment during the 1990s. It is 
likely to remain in this condition after 1999. Even more ominously, even when the rate of growth 
recovers after cyclical downturns (as it may in 1997), the level of unemployment remains at high 
levels.  
Employment has thus become (to some extent) uncoupled from the rate of growth. Indeed, most 
of the member states of the EU (and particularly those which are most likely to move to the third 
stage of EMU in 1999) seem to be locked into historically high rates of unemployment. As the 
data in Table 3 suggest, France, Belgium, Ireland, Finland, and Spain - all likely participants in 
the third stage of EMU - are expected to have unemployment rates of 12 percent or more in 
1997. And in Germany, where the rate of unemployment is projected to be above 10 percent for 
1997 as a whole, the seasonally unadjusted rate of unemployment soared above 12 percent in the 
first month of the year. 
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Those in favor of EMU have argued that eliminating exchange rate uncertainty through the 
creation of a single currency will reduce transaction costs within the single market. Also, it will 
(they claim) increase the risk-adjusted rate of return on investment, which will stimulate higher 
levels of investment. This in turn will raise the rate of growth and help to reduce unemployment.  
Moreover, EMU will (advocates argue) help to keep down interest rates. Low inflation in the 
member states participating in EMU, the improvement of their public finances, and the 
credibility of their commitment to maintain those policies for the foreseeable future will allow 
interest rates to be lower than at present. This will further stimulate investment, growth, and 
employment.  
Such assumptions are quite plausible. But participation in EMU may well not have any of these 
beneficial consequences. Indeed, the assumptions themselves may be wrong.  
Take first the belief that use of a single currency will eliminate transaction costs that would 
otherwise prevent investment. This assumption is implausible, since most if not all major 
investors have long since learned the fine art of hedging as a means of reducing the uncertainty 
associated with transactions in multiple currencies. Indeed, most major international economic 
actors - including, almost certainly, those accounting for the vast bulk of investment in the EU - 
routinely conduct transactions in the various EU currencies.  
Take, secondly, the belief that low rates of inflation, small public deficits, and public 
commitment to those policies will enable the EMU participants to enjoy lower interest rates. 
They may, indeed, enjoy such interest rates. But their monetary policy will be under the control 
of a central bank that will be free of political instruction, singularly committed to maintaining 
price stability, and intent on keeping interest rates high enough to prevent inflationary increases in the money supply and depreciation of the value of the euro even at the cost of low growth and 
high unemployment.  
Moreover, for the sake of its own credibility, the ECB will probably be especially stringent in 
carrying out such a policy in its early years. During this period, its officials will be concerned 
with establishing the bank's credibility as the guardian of the value of the euro, not only with the 
markets, but also with the national publics, which, with some considerable skepticism, agreed to 
"lose their money."  
Interest rates under the aegis of the ECB may be lower than a weighted average of the current 
rates in the member states participating in the third stage. But it is more likely that a central bank, 
which by its founding statute (Protocol 3 of the Treaty) will be politically independent and 
committed to maintaining stable prices, will maintain rates in such a way as to prevent 
inflationary increases in the money supply, even at the cost of low growth and high 
unemployment.  
EMU participants might seek to alleviate the pattern of relatively low rates of economic growth 
and high levels of unemployment by managing the external exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis 
other currencies. By stabilizing the external exchange rate or otherwise keeping it from 
appreciating vis-à-vis other currencies such as the dollar and the yen, they might conceivably 
provide a price advantage for "euro- zone" exports and make externally produced goods less 
competitive within the "euro-zone." Such a strategy would boost growth and presumably create 
or maintain jobs within the zone. And indeed Article 109.1 of the Treaty on European Union 
does authorize the Council of Ministers to conclude formal agreements on an exchange rate 
system with non-EU currencies and to adjust or abandon the rate of the euro in such systems. 
Further, Article 109.2 provides that, in the absence of such a system, the Council of Ministers 
may formulate "general orientations" for exchange rate policy with non-EU currencies.  
But the Treaty places certain constraints on the Council of Ministers in regard to the external 
exchange rate, which might inhibit it from pursuing a strategy of competitive devaluation. 
Article 109.1 stipulates that the Council of Ministers must act unanimously, must act upon a 
recommendation from the ECB or the Commission, and must consult with the ECB "in an 
endeavor to reach a consensus consistent with the objective of price stability." And in regard to 
the formulation of "general orientations," the Council must act, by qualified majority, upon the 
recommendation of the Commission, followed by consultation with the ECB, or upon the 
recommendation of the ECB. And as with the agreements described in 109.1, these 
"orientations" must be "without prejudice to the primary objective of the ESCB to maintain price 
stability."  
Given the constraints specified in Article 109, the consultative role provided for the ECB in 
exchange rate policy, and the admonition to adhere to the objective of price stability, it is clearly 
more likely that the participating member states will obtain little or no relief from their condition 
of low growth and high unemployment through manipulation of the exchange rate of the euro.  
Indeed, if anything, we might predict that the euro would be allowed to float and to appreciate 
vis-à-vis non-EU currencies, just as its closest antecedent, the German mark, has floated and appreciated over the past decade. Such floating would be consistent with the ECB's guidelines 
and would occur regardless of adverse effects that it would have on the competitive position of 
member states in export markets, on their balance of trade, and, at home, on growth and 
employment. 
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Lest there be doubt about that, it is perhaps useful to cite what one of the principal architects of 
EMU has to say about the relative importance of domestic price stability and exchange-rate 
stability:  
The Bundesbank always decided in favor of domestic price stability and sacrificed 
exchange-rate stability if necessary.... The Bundesbank, I assume, is much 
happier [after the 1992-93 ERM crisis] living with a de facto floating system, with 
practically no intervention obligations for the time being, than with a system of 
fixed but adjustable exchange rates, which [has been] accurately called "half-
baked" because adjustments never take place at the right moment....The mandate 
of the ECB must be to maintain stability of the value of money as the prime 
objective of European monetary policy...Domestic stability of the value of money 
must take precedence over exchange-rate stability. 
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If the preference for domestic price stability to exchange-rate stability that Karl-Otto Pöhl 
describes is typical of all central bankers, it is probably also true that the Governing Council of 
the new ECB will be especially sensitive to the same priorities in its early years, as it attempts to 
establish credibility for itself and for the euro by demonstrating its commitment to maintaining 
stable prices.  
The euro, like its predecessors that remained in the ERM after 1992-93, is thus likely to be a 
strong currency relative to others such as the dollar and the yen. It will probably be allowed to 
float and to appreciate, even at the cost of continued losses of export markets and, in turn, of 
production, jobs, and income at home. This outcome is all the more likely since the EU has gone 
to such lengths to immunize the ECB from those - exporters, workers, governments - who might 
prefer an undervalued currency that would give exports a competitive advantage to the 
alternative of maintaining stable prices.  
Moving to the third stage of EMU and irrevocably locking exchange rates may have salutary 
consequences - perhaps the most important being the elimination of the instability and 
fluctuation among the European currencies that occurred every time the D-Mark increased in 
value against the dollar. But it will probably do little to improve the competitive position of the 
"euro-zone" in the world and provide an export-based boost to growth and employment. Indeed, 
if anything, the constraints operating on the external exchange rate of the euro may actually 
contribute to a deterioration in the competitive position of the economies of those participating 
member states in global markets, thereby accentuating the pattern of low growth and high 
unemployment at home that already characterizes so much of Europe.  
This prospect is bound to have political as well as economic consequences. Citizens will blame 
their own governments for the lack of growth and continued unemployment, but they may also 
blame the EU in general and the EMU project in particular. The foundation of public support upon which EMU ultimately rests has already eroded significantly. Indeed, if one were to 
extrapolate from recent experience, it is quite conceivable that some of the governments in 
member states that can be expected to participate in the third stage of EMU may, at some point 
in the not-too-distant future, find themselves confronted by significant numbers of voters who 
have concluded that the costs of EMU exceed the benefits.  
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of Eurobarometer surveys conducted in the member states of 
the EU. The data in Table 4 reveal that widespread erosion occurred in the 1990s in the extent to 
which citizens of the EU member states believed their country had benefited from membership in 
the EU. For example, [compared with the situation in late 1991] those data suggest that the 
distribution of public opinion between those believing their country had benefited from 
membership in the EU and those believing it had not shifted markedly toward the negative in all 
but one (Ireland) of the member states.  
In some countries - notably, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, France, and Germany - the erosion in 
support for the EU has been dramatic. Admittedly, as of late 1995, public opinion in 8 of the 
fifteen member states appeared, on balance, to believe that the country had benefited from 
membership. But in the other 7 member states - Germany, France, Spain, and Britain, and the 
three 1995 entrants - roughly as many, or more, citizens felt their country had not benefited from 
membership as thought it had. 
22 In sum, the European public appears to be deeply divided over, 
and skeptical about, the value of membership in the Union - perhaps more so than at any time 
since Eurobarometer began asking the question in the early 1980s.  
The same Eurobarometer data reveal a substantial degree of opposition to the single currency, 
the feature that, in the view of the European public, is perhaps the most salient aspect of EMU. 
In late 1995, close to a majority (47 percent) of the EU public supported introduction of the 
single currency (see Table 5). But a substantial minority (33 percent) did not. And in at least 6 
member states - Germany, Finland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Austria, and Sweden - more 
people opposed than supported the single currency.  
Who Will Make Economic Policy in the Third Stage?  
The discussion in the preceding section raises the fundamental question of whether the member 
states that participate in the third stage of EMU will be capable of addressing the enduring 
problems of low growth and high unemployment in the EU. This question represents a larger 
issue of institutional design and governance that confronts the EU in regard to EMU and that will 
continue to confront the member states, which participate in the third stage. The answer to the 
question depends on whether the member states participating in the third stage of EMU will have 
the institutional capacity and authority to conduct economic policy. The Treaty on European 
Union is far from encouraging in that regard. Article 102a commits all of the member states, 
including those participating in the third and final stage of EMU, to conducting their economic 
policies with a view to achieving the objectives of the Community as described in Article 2 
("harmonious and balanced development," "sustainable growth," "convergence of economic 
performance," and a "high level of employment," etc.). Article 103.1 stipulates that the member 
states will regard their economic policies as a matter of "common concern" and shall "co-
ordinate them within the Council [of Ministers]...." Article 103.2 stipulates that the Council, acting by qualified majority on a recommendation from the Commission, shall "formulate a draft 
for the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the member states and the Community," and 
that the European Council will then "discuss a conclusion on the broad guidelines" that will, in 
turn, become the basis for a Council "recommendation setting out these broad guidelines."  
The language of these Articles - the use of such phrases as "common concern," "co-ordinate ... 
within the Council," "formulate a draft," "broad guidelines, " "discuss a conclusion," and 
"recommendations setting out these broad guidelines" - indicates that the Treaty creates no new 
authority or competence in the field of economic policy. It sets up no new institutional body in 
the area of economic policy that would include only the member states participating in the third 
and final stage of EMU. It creates no new competences or policy instruments for use by 
participating member states in the realm of economic policy. Instead, the Councils, composed of 
the representatives of all of the EU member states, will simply formulate guidelines, discuss 
conclusions, and make recommendations based on those guidelines and conclusions.  
Just how far the Treaty fails to create the authority and institutional capacity by which member 
states could act collectively in the domain of economic policy becomes most obvious when the 
cursory language of Article 103 is juxtaposed with the extensive discussion in Articles 105-109 
and Protocols 3 and 4 pertaining to monetary policy, the ESCB, and the ECB. In a single-minded 
effort to create a strong independent central bank, the authors of the Treaty ignored a simple and 
obvious fact of political life - which no central bank, independent or otherwise, has ever, or 
could, operate without a political counterpart that is responsible for shaping the overall contours 
of economic policy.  
Some voices within the EU have recognized the need for such a political counterpart once the 
third stage of EMU has begun. President Jacques Chirac, for example, has called several times 
for a political force to offset the power of the ECB -- precisely such a "political counterpart." 
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In mid-December 1996, the French minister of finance, Jean Arthuis, repeated the French call for 
the creation of some institutional form - perhaps, he suggested, a council for stability and growth 
composed of the representatives of the member states participating in the third stage of EMU - to 
act as a political counterweight to the ECB.  
Not surprisingly, the central bankers have reacted negatively to these proposals. Hans Tietmeyer, 
the President of the German Bundesbank, has denounced the effort to create a pouvoir politique 
and has warned that such an effort does not conform to the Treaty. Nevertheless, the French 
government continues to advocate creation of such a council, and in February 1997 it received 
the endorsement of Jacques Delors, who suggested that a protocol be added to the Treaty 
allowing for the creation of a council to coordinate macroeconomic policy. 
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At a meeting of the finance ministers and heads of the central banks of France and Germany in 
Lyon in March 1997, the German officials appeared to shift their position to one of qualified 
support for the French proposal for a "stability and growth" council, composed of the finance 
ministers of the member states participating in the third stage, which would coordinate economic 
policy. This shift occurred, apparently, after the French officials had assured the Germans that 
the proposed council would be informal, would concern itself with economic policy and not 
monetary policy, and would not intrude upon the independence of the ECB. 
25 However, several days later, at a meeting of the fifteen finance ministers, the Council of Ministers, while accepting 
the idea in principle, indicated that the proposed body would have little power, would not act as a 
"political counterweight" to the ECB, and would not possess responsibility for exchange rate 
policy (which would remain in the hands of the full Council of Ministers, as opposed to the 
ministers of the Stage Three participants). 
26 These efforts to water down the original French 
proposal suggest that it is unlikely that any "counterweight" will be created prior to the advent of 
the third stage. As low growth and high unemployment continue to afflict economic life in the 
EU after 1999, as they almost certainly will, citizens and governments of the member states 
participating in the "euro-zone" will almost certainly ask, even more frequently than they do 
now, who makes economic policy in the EU and why the EU is unable to achieve higher rates of 
growth and reduce the high levels of unemployment. And the asking of those questions will 
almost certainly lead, in turn, to renewed calls for the creation of precisely that pouvoir politique 
that is now absent and that the finance ministers are so reluctant to endorse.  
Conclusion  
This paper has considered two kinds of issues facing EMU. One concerns qualifications and 
membership: how qualifications are evaluated and which member states are likely to meet the 
criteria set for membership in the third stage of EMU in 1999. The other concerns the capacity of 
member states, individually and collectively, to deal with economic policy after the advent of the 
third stage. In particular, will they be able to address the long-term problems of low growth and 
high unemployment that afflict so much of Europe?  
In regard to the first issue, the paper suggests, for supporters of EMU, some reason for optimism. 
It is very likely that the third stage of EMU will begin on the first day of 1999 and also that the 
"euro-zone" that comes into being on that day will, in all likelihood, include a large number of 
member states - almost certainly as many as 8 and probably as many as 10 or 11. This outcome is 
likely because of  
a) the complexity of the process by which the qualifications of the member states 
for participation in the third stage will be assessed;  
b) the latitude for discretionary judgment accorded by the Treaty;  
c) the existence of precedents for waiving certain of the "convergence criteria"; 
and  
d) the fact that the final decision will be made by the European Council, rather 
than the Council of Ministers. 
On the second issue - the capacity of EMU to address the long-term problems of low growth and 
high unemployment - the paper suggests some reason for concern and pessimism. Most of the 
member states participating in the third stage of EMU are likely to continue experiencing low 
growth and high unemployment. Neither monetary policy nor exchange rate policy is likely to be 
applied so as to generate any significant increase in the long-term rate of economic growth or 
any decrease in the high levels of unemployment that now exist in most of the likely "euro-zone" members. Moreover, the Treaty creates no institutional capacity for collective action in economic 
policy that might enable the member states participating in EMU to redress those problems, and 
there seems to be little desire in the EU as a whole to create that institutional capacity.    
 
NOTES  
1 Earlier versions were presented at the workshop on "Supranational Governance: The 
Institutionalization of the European Union, Center for German and European Studies", 
University of California, Berkeley, November 1996; the Team Europe Retreat of the European 
Union Delegation of the European Commission, Washington, D.C., March 1997; and the Annual 
Meeting of the Inter-American Development Bank, Barcelona, Spain, March 1997. back to text  
2 At Madrid, the European Council adopted the EMI's "reference scenario" for the phase-in of the 
single currency, and phase-out of national currencies, by mid-2002. For the scenario, see EMI 
1995. For the Council's decision, see European Commission 1995, 24-28. back to text  
3 "The Council of Ministers (or simply Council) represents the member state governments. The 
Council is composed of members state ministers: depending on the matter under discussion, 
either the ones responsible for specific policy areas (environment, transport, treasury) or the 
foreign ministers for general affairs.... The Council decides unanimously on major policy 
decisions as laid down in the treaty provisions, and in principle decides with a qualified majority 
on ... some matters ... [such as] ... the decisions about provisions to implement the decisions 
taken in unanimity....  
The European Council is a special meeting of the Council of Ministers, in which the 
representatives of the Member States are the political heads of governments themselves (13 PMs 
and the Presidents of France and Finland, plus their PMs if in a situation of "cohabitation"). The 
Foreign Ministers and three members of the Commission, including its President, also 
participate. The European Council should not be confused with the Council of Europe which is a 
totally separate international organization independent of the EU.  
The European Council convenes twice a year.... Its meetings and statements are often very 
important in providing political impetus or laying down guidelines in areas of prime importance 
to the EU, but it leaves the day-to-day legislative work to the ordinary Council meetings".  
From EU Basics (http://eubasics.allmansland.com/), edited by Roland Siebelink with the help 
from Bart Schelfhout, Version 2.3.1., 25 March 1996. back to text  
4 In March 1997, the Commission proposed a timetable for the 1998 decision according to which 
it and the EMI would make their recommendations by mid-March 1998 and, after 6 weeks of 
consultation with national parliaments and the European Parliament, the European Council 
would make the final decision at a meeting in the United Kingdom by the end of April 1998. See 
Financial Times, 1-2 March 1997, p.2 back to text  
5 Finland after the markka's entry into the ERM in October 1996. back to text  6 By February 1997, the annual rate of change in consumer prices in Spain had decelerated to 2.5 
percent. If sustained, that would almost certainly allow Spain to satisfy the >convergence 
criterion= pertaining to the rate of inflation. See Financial Times, 14 March 1997, p.3. back to 
text  
7 In March 1997, the Commission issued the first set of "harmonized" rates of inflation for the 
EU. The data for the 12-month period through January 1997 indicate that all of the member 
states except Spain, Portugal, and Greece would satisfy the Treaty criterion (and Spain and 
Portugal missed by only 0.1 per cent). Although flawed by its omission of health, education, and 
home ownership costs, the "harmonized" rate will be used in the 1998 decisions in assessing 
compliance with the Treaty criterion. See Financial Times, 8-9 March 1997, p.2. back to text  
8 The decision in regard to Denmark reflected the fact that, as the EMI has noted (1996, 21), the 
gross debt for the country includes assets held by the Social Pension Fund against sectors outside 
the general government, government deposits at the central bank for management of the 
country's foreign exchange reserves, and amounts outstanding in government debt from 
financing of public undertakings. Excluding those funds from the calculation reduces the 
debt/GDP ratio to a range of 50-55 per cent. Despite the rationale, Germany formally objected to 
the decision. back to text  
9 The 9 include Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Portugal, Spain, 
and (possibly) Italy. back to text  
10 In 1997, the Belgian public debt is projected to be 127 per cent of GDP. There are, however, 
two reasons (in addition to the obvious one pertaining to the importance of Brussels for the EU) 
why Belgium may nevertheless be exempted from an "excessive deficit" judgment. For one 
thing, because its public debt is largely held domestically, the debt could be judged to have little 
impact on its neighbors. Second, because Belgium has a currency union with Luxembourg, even 
if it does not join stage three, as long as Luxembourg joins, the Belgian franc will, in effect, be 
irrevocably locked vis-à-vis the currencies of the stage three participants and the euro (without 
Belgium having the right to sit on the Governing Council of the ECB). In such circumstances, it 
is quite plausible that the European Council, if not the Council of Ministers, will grant Belgium 
an exception to the "excessive deficits" criterion, provided its 1997 budget deficit does not 
exceed three percent. back to text  
11 The stock of public debt in the three countries in 1997 is estimated to be 57 percent in France, 
63 percent in Germany, and 69 percent in Spain. At the meeting of finance ministers on 17 
March 1997, Theo Waigel indicated that Germany would seek a flexible interpretation of the 
Treaty that would exempt it from the 60 per cent criterion, on the grounds that the increase in 
Germany's debt/GDP ratio in recent years reflected the exceptional circumstances of German 
unification and the privatization of the railways. See Financial Times, 18 March 1996, p.20. back 
to text  
12 The deficit reduction would be achieved by reductions of 25 trillion lire in expenditure, 
increases of standard revenue of 12.5 trillion lire, a further 12.5 trillion lire yielded by a "Euro" 
tax, and another 12 trillion lire derived from "Treasury operations." back to text  13 Whereas in 1996, most attention was concentrated on the question of whether France would 
meet the three per cent deficit criterion, by early 1997 attention had shifted to the distinct 
possibility that Germany would not meet that criterion, and the possibility that stage three would 
either have to be delayed until Germany could participate or would occur without Germany. back 
to text  
14 It was, of course, precisely this ambiguity that Germany sought to redress in its proposal for a 
"stability pact" that would, for purposes of deciding whether an "excessive deficit" exists, define 
"exceptional circumstances" with a specific figure relating to the magnitude of the decline in 
GDP. Yet, interestingly, even after long and protracted bargaining at Dublin had narrowed the 
application of "exceptional" to annual declines in GDP of at least 2 percent, the final language 
included the phrase "as a rule." And Commission and Council discretion remains in the case of 
declines in the range of 0.75 to 2 percent. See Conclusions of the Presidency, Dublin, December 
1996. back to text  
15 See Article 104c(6) of the Treaty. back to text  
16 See Article 109j. back to text  
17 Denmark negotiated an "opt-out" from the third stage, which appears in Protocol 12 of the 
Treaty. After the Danish electorate rejected the Treaty in the referendum of 2 June 1992, 
Denmark negotiated a package of clarifications and "opt-outs" as the necessary condition for 
scheduling a second referendum. At the conclusion of that negotiation at the Edinburgh meeting 
of the European Council in December 1992, Denmark gave notice that it would not participate in 
the third stage. back to text  
18 Financial Times, 19 April 1996, p.2. back to text  
19 Financial Times, 2 February 1997. In February, the seasonally unadjusted rate rose by 13,000, 
to 4.67 million, or 12.2 percent of the work force. See Financial Times, 7 March 1997, p.16. 
back to text  
20 See the chart accompanying Samuel Brittan, "Right rate for the franc," Financial Times, 12 
September 1996, p.12. Kenen 1995, 111-12, notes that until the single currency replaces the 
national currencies (by July, 2002 at the latest), foreign exchange traders are likely to use the 
mark as a proxy for all of the currencies that are, as of January 1, 1999, irrevocably locked. back 
to text  
21 Karl-Otto Poehl, "International Monetary Policy: A Personal View," in Gaidar and Poehl 
1995, pp. 61, 67, 109. back to text  
22 Cameron 1996b, Table 13.4, reports consistently strong inverse correlations across the 
member states of the EU between the level of unemployment and the proportion of the EU 
national publics believing their country has benefited from membership in the EU. There are also 
strong positive correlations between the magnitude of the increase in unemployment in the early 1990s and the magnitude of the erosion in the proportion believing their country has benefited 
from membership. back to text  
23 Most recently at his meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Nuremberg before the December 
1996 meeting of the European Council in Dublin. back to text  
24 On the comments by Chirac, Arthuis, Tietmeyer, and Delors, see, respectively, Financial 
Times, 10 December 1996, p.16; 17 December 1996, p.1; 20 January 1997, p.1 and 28 February 
1997, p.2. back to text  
25 See Financial Times, March 13, 1997, 16. back to text  
26See Financial Times, 19 March 1997, p.2. back to text    
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Table 1 
The Convergence Criteria for the Third Stage of EMU: Performance of the Member States 
of the EU in 1995-96 in regard to Inflation, Interest Rates, and Participation in the ERM 
   
Participation in the ERM  Inflation (% Change, cpi) 
Interest Rates (Long-term govt. 
securities)  w/o "tension" or 
devaluation 
        1995  1996  1995  1996 
 Belgium  Yes*  1.5*  2.1*  7.4*  6.3* 
Denmark  Yes*  2.1*  2.1*  8.3*  7.1* 
Germany  Yes*  1.8*  1.5*  6.8*  6.1* 
Greece  No*  9.3*  8.5  17.3  ... 
Spain  Yes**  4.7  3.6  11.0  8.2* 
France  Yes*  1.7*  2.0*  7.7*  6.5* 
Ireland  Yes*  2.5*  1.7*  8.3*  7.4* 
Italy  Yes**  5.4*  4.0  11.8*  9.0 
Luxemburg  Yes*  1.9*  1.3*  7.6*  6.6* 
Netherlands  Yes*  1.9*  2.0*  7.2*  6.5* 
Austria  Yes**  2.3*  1.8*  6.5*  5.3* 
Portugal  Yes**  4.1  3.1  11.4  8.6* 
Finland  Yes**  1.0*  0.6*  7.9*  6.0* 
Sweden  No  2.9*  0.5*  10.2  8.0* 
U.K.  No  3.4  2.4  8.2*  8.1* 
   * Satisfies criteria stipulated in Article 109j and Protocol 6: For inflation, a rate that does not exceed by more 
than 1.5 percentage points the average of the three lowest (underlined). For interest rates, a rate that does not 
exceed by more than 2 percentage points the average of the rates in the three countries with the lowest 
inflation rates. For the ERM, state has respected the "normal" fluctuation margins without severe tensions 
for at least the last two years without a devaluation made on its own initiative.  
** The Spanish peseta participates in the ERM but was devalued in March 1995. The Portuguese escudo was 
devalued at the same time but the initiative for the devaluations is generally seen as having come from Spain. 
The Austrian schilling joined the ERM in January 1995. The Finnish markka joined in October 1996. The 
Italian lira rejoined in November 1996.  
   
Source: IMF 1997, p. 69; OECD 1996, pp. A19, A39; 1997, p. 27. The 1996 rates of inflation for Denmark, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, and Sweden are for 11 months, as are the 1996 interest rate 
figures for Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands.    
 
   
Table 2 
The Budgetary Criteria for the Third Stage of EMU: 
Government Deficits, Public Debt, and "Excessive Deficits," 1995-97 
   
General Council Decision that 
"Excessive Deficit" Exists  
Government Deficit/GDP  Public Debt/GDP 
      1995  1996  1997e  1995  1996  1997e 
Belgium  Yes (9/94)  4.1  3.2  2.9*  133.7  129.9  127.2 
Denmark  No (6/96)   
Yes (9/94) 
1.6*  1.5*  0.4*  71.9  71.9  70.4 
Germany  Yes (6/96)   
No (7/95)   
Yes (9/94) 
3.5  4.1  3.4  58.1*  61.3  63.2 
Greece  Yes (9/94)  9.1  8.2  5.7  111.8  108.5  104.5 
Spain  Yes (9/94)  6.6  4.8  3.4  65.8  68.0  68.9 
France  Yes (9/94)  4.8  4.1  3.2  52.8*  55.1*  56.6* 
Ireland  No (9/94)  2.3*  1.5*  1.1*  84.8  80.2  76.0 Italy  Yes (9/94)  7.1  6.7  3.7  124.9  124.4  122.9 
Luxembourg  No (9/94)  -0.4*  -2.0*  ...*  6.1*  ...*  ...* 
Netherlands  Yes (9/94)**  4.0  2.6*  2.3*  80.0  78.0  76.0 
Austria  Yes (7/95)  5.9  4.3  3.0*  69.0  71.8  73.3 
Portugal  Yes (9/94)  4.9  3.8  2.9*  71.7  70.3  67.6 
Finland  Yes (7/95)**  5.4  2.9*  1.7*  59.2*  60.1  60.2 
Sweden  Yes (7/95)  7.9  3.8  2.5*  79.4  78.7  78.5 
U.K.  Yes (9/94)  5.7  4.8  3.7  53.9*  56.1*  56.5* 
   
* Equal to or less than reference values stipulated in Protocol 5 (3 % for the deficit and 60 % for 
public debt).  
** As the paper went to press in May 1997, the Council decided that the Netherlands and Finland no 
longer had "excessive deficits". 
  Source: 1995 data and estimates for 1996 and 1997 reported in OECD 1996, pp. 9, A33, A69. The negative 




Growth and Unemployment in the European Union, 1995-97 
  
   % Change in "Real GDP"  % Unemployed (Commonly-used measures) 
   1995  1996e  1997e  1995  1996e  1997e 
Belgium  1.9  1.3  2.2  13.0  13.2  13.0 
Denmark  2.8  1.9  2.9  10.3  8.9  8.6 
Germany  1.9  1.1  2.2  9.4  10.3  10.4 
Greece  2.0  2.2  2.5  10.0  10.1  10.3 
Spain  2.8  2.1  2.7  23.3  22.7  22.4 
France  2.2  1.3  2.5  11.7  12.4  12.5 
Ireland  10.3  7.0  6.2  12.2  12.0  11.8 Italy  3.0  0.8  1.2  12.0  12.2  12.2 
Luxembourg  3.7  2.4  3.1  3.0  3.1  3.0 
Netherlands  2.1  2.7  2.7  7.1  6.6  6.2 
Austria  1.8  1.1  1.4  5.9  6.2  6.5 
Portugal  2.4  2.6  2.9  7.2  7.2  7.1 
Finland  4.2  2.5  3.5  17.2  16.4  15.5 
Sweden  3.6  1.7  2.2  7.7  7.9  7.4 
U.K.  2.4  2.4  3.3  8.2  7.6  7.4 
EU  2.5  1.6  2.4  11.2  11.4  11.3 
   




Support for the European Community: 
Percent Believing Country Has Benefited/Not Benefited/Not Benefited from Membership? 
  
   November-December 1995    
   Percent Saying Membership  Change in Net Percent Saying 
   Has  
Benefited  
Country 
Has Not  
Benefited 
Country 
Net  Membership Has/Has Not 
Benefited Country 
October-November 1991 
to November-December 1995 
Ireland  80  7  73  +6 
 Greece  72  18  54  -5 
 Luxembourg  66  19  47  -10 
Netherlands  66  20  46  -16 
Portugal  66  21  45  -28 Denmark  59  29  30  -12 
Italy  52  22  30  -14 
Belgium  45  35  10  -38 
Germany  40  36  4  -18 
U.K.  40  43  -3  -10 
France  39  39  0  -22 
Spain  39  41  -2  -31 
Finland  39  42  -3  N/A 
Austria  32  47  -15  N/A 
Sweden  19  54  -35  N/A 
              
EU  44  35  9    
   
Full wording: "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that [our country] has on balance 
benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?"  
Source: European Commission 1994, pp. 89-97; 1996, p. 17.  
 
Table 5 
   
Public Support in the EU for Introduction of a Single Currency, 
October-December 1995 
   
   % Favoring/Opposed to Introduction of Single European Currency* 
   Yes  No  Net 
Italy  68  10  58 
Netherlands   64  28  36 Ireland  60  17  43 
Luxembourg  59  22  37 
Spain  58  18  40 
France  58  23  35 
Greece  52  20  32 
Belgium  51  25   26 
 Portugal   46  21  25 
 Germany   34   45  -11 
 Finland   33   53   -20 
United Kingdom   32   56   -24 
Denmark  32  60   -28 
 Sweden   29   54   -25 
 Austria   23   43   -20 
           
 EU   47   33   14 
   
   
Full wording: "Are you for or against the European Union having one European currency in all member 
states, including (respondent's country)? That is, replacing the (name of currency) by the European 
currency? Are you very much for, somewhat for, somewhat against, very much against, neither for nor 
against, or don't know?"  
 Source: European Commission 1996, p. 49.  
 